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39 INTRODUCTION 
The High Authority has been requested by the Internal Market 
Committee to submit an account of its policy regarding the implementa-
tion of Articles 65 and 66  of the E. C. S.C.  Treaty.  It would first men-
tion that Prof.  WagenfUhr's Report E.C.S.C.  1952- 1962,  {1)  a  special 
reprint of which was recently laid before the Committee,  contains an 
exposition of the subject which fully reflects its own thinking. 
Moreover,  the following briefly  restates, from the angle both 
of theory and of practice,  a  number of fundamental points in this connec-
tion which have already been gone into at various of the Committee's 
meetings. 
The High Authority's function under the two Articles is to is sue 
ru.lings  on specific  ~ases, either in response to applications for authori-
zation or on its own initiative. Accordingly, its policy can best be indi-
cated by referring to the more important of its decisions and  conclusions 
in this regard.  This in itself makes clear that the High Authority has not 
simply adopted a  string of empirical decisions: on the contrary,  a  well-
marked line of connected thought emerges,  showing that it has adhered 
to a  systematic policy in line with the provisions of Articles 6 5 and 66. 
(1)  This Report is available, in the four official Community languages 
only (French,  German, Italian and Dutch),  from the Central Sales 
Office for Publications of the European Communities,  2,  Place de 
Metz,  Luxembourg. 6 
In implem~nting the Articles, the High Authority has in each case 
to take account of certain basic factors and of general economic trends 
and developments,  which may be roughly summed up as follows. 
a)  It is nowadays a  recognized point of economic theory that the nature 
and degree of competition are governed by certain given elements, 
such as the structure of the markets concerned, the number and 
weight of the market operators, the elasticity of supply and demand, 
and considerations of location and of transport distances.  The de-
gree of competition in any particular market cannot therefore be 
regulated at will.  This is very much the case with oligopolistic 
setups,  of which the Community coal and steel industries are ty-
pical examples. Articles 65 and 66 have to be interpreted in the 
light of these· built-in facts,  which the Treaty cannot alter.  The 
High Authority is required simply to see to it that competition is 
not more restricted than these Articles permit. 
b)  The structure of the coal and steel markets is dictated by certain 
conditions of production and competition which are only to a  limited 
extent intercomparable.  The most important factor in this respect 
is that the coalmining industry is so very much more tied by ques-
tions of location. In addition,  production and marketing conditions 
have undergone radical changes since the Treaty came into  force, 
partly as a  result of alterations in transport flows. 
The following points should be  specially mentioned. 
When the Common Market was first introduced,  Community coal 
was still vital to the covering of the  six countries' overall energy 
requirements.  Since then,  technical and economic developments 
have caused it to lose a  great deal of ground to oil and natural gas. 
This substitution process has been further accelerated by changes 
in the transport field,  and hence in transport costs,  including in 7 
particular on the one hand the movement of maritime freight-rates 
and on the other the installation of a  growing network of pipelines. 
Consequently,  despite persevering and successful efforts to step up 
prod.uctivity,  the Community coalmining industry•  s  competitive posi-
tion has entirely altered. 
The energy market today forms very mu~h more a  single whole 
than it did even a  few years ago.  For cornpetition to be a  working 
possibility in such a  market, the rules of competition would need to 
be the same for all the energy sources.  And this of course they de-
finitely are not,  as is clear if we compare the relevant provisions 
of the Treaty of Paris and the Treaties of Rome. It should be added 
that elasticity of supply differs very widely as between the coal-
mining,  the oil and the natural-gas industry,  with the obvious result 
that the suppliers 
1  approach differs accordingly. 
These circumstances explain the action taken by some individual 
Governments to avert or alleviate serious hardship to the collieries 
and the miners.  Provided State intervention of this kind does not 
involve the collieries in actual restriction of competition,  the High 
Authority can take no steps under Articles 65 and 66.  This is not  to 
say, however,  that it is precluded either from continuing to inves-
tigate individual cases as they arise,  or from conducting its activi-
ties as usual in accordance with other provisions in the Treaty.  In 
these circumstances,  both the High Authority and the European Par-
liament have repeatedly drawn attention to the desirab.ility of amend-
ing the anti-restrictive provisions in line with the changed situation. 
Articles 65  and 66 ·afford very little scope, however,  more par-
ticularly inasmuch as they form a  connected whole with Article 4 
and Article 60 (see WagenfUhr Report,  n°  343).  The Court of Justice 
in its legal ruling on the proposals submitted to it for the amendment 8 
of Article 65 along these lines pointed out that the Article was indis-
sociably bound up with the basic provisions of the Treaty.  The High 
Authority is accordingly obliged to enforce the Treaty as it stands. 
It is a  quite different and altogether bigger question how far a  com-
mon energy policy should be framed to take account of these altered 
circumstances. 
c)  In the steel sector also the pattern has  shifted considerably in the 
past ten years  - not,  admittedly,  to anything like such a  revoluti-
onary extent as in the case of coal,  but nevertheless enough noticea-
bly to affect the industry's conditions of competition.  A  combination 
of technical and locational developments is mainly responsible.  The 
technical trend - largely influenced by the fact that the same process 
is going on,  and frequently going on faster,  in countries ouside the 
Community - is towards increasing concentration of production in 
large production units. 
This is not,  however,  necessarily synonymous with restriction 
of competition in the market.  Although when two enterprises form a 
concentration competition between them of course ceases, the 
stronger market position occupied by the new enterprise so consti-
tuted can serve to intensify competition with others.  The larger the 
production units become, the more,  as  a  rule, the market too 
should broaden, with competition becoming fuller and keener.  Ge-
nerally speaking,  in the appraisal of horizontal steel concentrations 
the relevant market is today more and more having to be taken as 
covering the whole northern industrial triangle,  comprising the 
component segments of the Ruhr,  the Netherlands,  Belgium, Luxem-
bourg, Northern France, Lorraine and the Saar.  For competition 
among the enterprises is more and more extending throughout this 
area. Furthermore, in judging conditions of competition in the steel 
market and assessing impending moves towards concentration, it 
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is becoming necessary to take increasing account of factors concern-
ing the Community's external trade relations. 
Thus the difference between external duties on steel products and 
on manufactured products can decisively affect the type of co-ope-
ration,  and in particular the range and scale of vertical concentra-
tions,  within the Community. It is quite possible that a  reduction of 
duties on manufactured steel goods will encourage increased verti-
cal concentration between Community steelmakers and manufactu-
rers. Whether intra-national or cross-frontier concentrations will 
predominate will depend,  among other things,  on the degree of har-
mony among the fiscal and company-law systems in the Community. 
d)  The Common Market for ore has also been undergoing structural 
changes,  partly coinciding with locational shifts. ip the iron and 
steel industry.  So far,  however,  there has been no major impact 
on competition in this sector. 
e)  The position as regards scrap is, by and large, that the Community 
cannot cover its requirements in full from its own resources.  When 
the Common Market was first introduced,  a  compensation scheme 
for imported scrap was set up to ensure equitable distribution of 
availabilities among all enterprises: this arrangement,  which led 
to certain car.tel-type agreements, is described in detail in theRe-
port.  How matters will develop in the future is,  however, at p~esent 
uncertain. It seems likely that the general weakness of the scrap 
markets, and the consequent inducements to speculative activity, 
will continue to present problems under Article 65. 10 
f)  One of the implications of these structural changes is of course (as 
was emphasized in particular in the Fayat Report to the European 
Parliament) that the criteria earlier adopted require radical revi-
sion.  The structural difficulties in the coal sector and the strides 
being made by the alternative energy sources make nonsense of the 
fears which used to be voiced that the collieries might be increa-
singly absorbed, via concentrations,  by the coal consumers.  The 
spectre of "giantism" that is held up in some quarters in view of 
the tendency,  for technical reasons, for production units to increase 
in size may be discounted,  especially as it is the High Authority's 
principle in approving concentrations to ensure that a  sufficient de-
gree of competition is maintained. Hence in concentration policy 
the purely quantitative aspect takes second place to other conside-
rations: these include in particular the elimination of interlocking 
directorates and of certain types of delivery contract, which would 
be liable to impair adequate competition among the large units. I 
THE  FUNDAMENTALS 
1.  The coal and steel markets are,  at all events at producer level, 
oligopolistic in character. 
a) The number of producers is comparatively limited. 
b) The fewness  and the size of the enterprises are largely dictated by 
technical production conditions,  and in particular by the substantial 
capital outlay on the installation of plant.  Current technical develop-
ments,  including especially the introduction of continuous rolling, 
large-diameter blast-furnaces and modern steelmaking methods such 
as the oxygen-blowing process,  are not only making for a  considerable 
extension of works' capacities, but are also influencing the enterprises' 
moves regarding concentration (see below). 
c) Capital-intensive enterprises with high fixed costs are subject to 
special production and marketing conditions, which are the reason 
for both the unusually wide variety of competitive devices they adopt 
and their predilection for restricting competition. 
d) The nature of concentration and of potentially restrictive inter-enter-
prise co-operation frequently differs very considerably according both 
to prevailing custom and to such factors as the state of fiscal and 
company law in the individual Community countries: this makes it 
difficult to  compar~ degrees of concentration and the scale and impli-
cations of particular restrictive arrangements. 
e) At the same time,  care has to be taken in assessing the enterprise 
pattern at any given juncture,  since experience has shown that concen-
trations or extensions of enterprises tend to ensue elsewhere in the 
market.  It is thus necessary to determine how far there can be said 
to be sufficient existing balance in size as among competitors in the 
markets,  with an eye both to the probable overall trend and to the 
probable reactions of the other competitors. 12  The fundamentals  ----------------------------------------------------------------
f)  There are various other points to be considered in addition to the size 
of the enterprises and concentrations.  One of the most important is 
the growing market interpenetration in the Community, which is re-
fleeted in the geographical delimitation of the  11relevant markets'' 
covered by High Authority Decisions.  The more extensive and inten-
sive interpenetration in the Common Market becomes, the larger the 
segments of it that are liable to be treated as the relevant market for 
the purposes of any particular Decision on cartels or concentrations. 
g)  It has further to be considered,  taking all other circumstances into 
account,  how far the competing enterprises are capable of taking 
independent, unbiased decisions concerning competition.  Consequently, 
in accordance with the European Parliament's Resolutions on the 
subject,  the High Authority has been making it more and more its 
practice to is sue its authorizing Decisions  subject to specific condi-
tions regarding interlocking directorates or material links between 
enterprises,  requiring these to be kept on a  scale where they cannot 
interfere with the proper play of competition. 
h)  In appraising competition between comparatively large enterprises or 
groups of enterprises, or joint-selling agencies,  in oligopolistic mar-
kets under E. C. S.C.  jurisdiction,  a  different approach has to be 
adopted according as the competing parties are in the steel or in the 
coal sector.  Although conditions of competition among steelmaking 
firms have been increasingly affected,  especially of late,  by locational 
shifts,  they are still very much freer than the collieries with regard 
to their natural and technical production conditions,  and hence to their 
conduct in competition.  The collieries, for reasons which need not be 
gone into here,  are not able readily to adjust themselves to changes 
in the market and in the pattern of competition; in addition,  it must 
be borne in mind that they face the oil  companies on unequal terms, 
partly because coal and oil fall under two different Treaties, and par-
tly because the oil industry is a  world organization. 
i)  The European P arliament1 s  Internal Market Committee is advocating 
an international comparison of the structural and competitive situation 
of the Community iron and steel industry with that of other major 
producer areas.  As regards comparison of prices and costs,  the 
WagenfO.hr Report (Nos.  4 7-82) describes tbe practical and methodolo-
gical difficulties,  and seeks from available facts and figures to as-
semble a  rough picture of the situation,  which within the general terms 
of reference applying clears up a  number of points in this connection. 
As regards market structure, it is proposed in the following pages 
to offer some additional particulars, though with the reminder that 
country-by-country comparisons can be misleading: apparent numeri-
cal equivalents may not be genuinely equivalent»  as comparability can 
often be seriously affected by imponderables peculiar to the individual 
country in question,  to its economic and social climate and its legal 
system. The fundamentals 
2.  Basing ourselves on these fundamentals,  we can now describe, 
referring as appropriate to important specific cases, both the general 
complex  of problems connected with cartels and concentrations,  and 
the High Authority's own policy in the matter, in particular regarding 
the implementation of Articles 65  and 66 of the Treaty.  Reference is 
made in the WagenfUhr Report (No.  345) to the forces which in oligopo-
listic markets regularly produce a  tendency to try to restrict competi-
tion by arranging either inter-company agreements or concentrations. 
3.  The Report's point is (leaving on one side,  for the sake of argu-
ment,  the Treaty's special provisions on the subject,  and in particular 
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its ban on discrimination) approximately as follows.  The big enterprises 
possessing enormous plant,  whose aggregate capacity frequently exceeds 
actual demand,  are not obliged to adopt any given line in competiton.  They 
can compete all-out or at half-throttle.  But competing does not consist 
merely in keeping or reducing general costs to a  minimum in order to be 
able to make more attractive offers: as conducted by enterprises with 
high fixed costs,  it can also consist in a  deliberate policy of price dif-
ferentiation.  Orders will be accepted the returns on which will not cover 
the whole cost of production,  only that represented by the additional order 
itself,  plus  a  varying portion of the fixed costs.  For it may be considered 
preferable to meet at least part of the fixed costs out of an extra order -
i.e.  to raise the utilization rate of the enterprise's capacity - than to forgo 
the order. 
This type of market strategy causes enterprises indirectly affected 
(by the loss of orders) to counter-attack in kind by pointing down their 
prices. 
4.  In recognition of this problem, the Treaty in addition to prohibit-
ing discrimination (in Article 60) compels enterprises to publish their 
price schedules.  This rule is, however,  rendered largely ineffective if 
non-Community suppliers come forward with low-priced quotations based 
on precisely the same considerations as those just described. 
Such action by outside enterprises results in their Community 
competitors aligning their prices downwards: this practice,  which is 
permitted by the Treaty, is liable also - depending on the general plant 
utilization position and the current degree of overcapacity - very appre-
ciably to affect the overall Community price level. 
For from the transport angle the Community is wide open.  Practi-
cally any point in it is easily accessible from the sea,  so that even com-
paratively small tonnages imported from non-Community countries can 
have a  disproportionate impact on prices throughout the internal market. 
It is worth bearing in mind in this connection that the Community's mari-
timity (1) is 7  1/2 times that of the United States. 
(1)  The ratio of ice-free coastline to surface area. 14  The fundamentals 
5,  A  further point is that most of the Community's coalfields and 
ore- and steel-producing areas lie close together within a  radius of only 
a  few hundred miles.  Moreover,  a  large proportion of the manufacturing 
firms for whose custom all the steelmakers are competing are also located 
in or close to these same areas. 
The United States has a  ~arge internal market very much less in-
fluenced by imports.  Total American imports of finished rolled products 
in 1960 were onlyftagain as high as the Community's.  In other words, 
whereas the Community is a  market in which producers are exposed, 
within a  comparatively small area,  to competition not only from one 
another but also to a  very notable degree from outside,  the American 
companies enjoy a  capacious internal market in which imports play a 
much smaller part. 
It is true that the American iron and steel industry too is highly 
concentrated geographically,  more particularly around Pittsburgh.  Never-
theless,  many enterprises are specially favourably situated in relation 
to their outlets,  either because the rest of the producers are in quite 
different parts of the country,  because they themselves are in the im-
mediate proximity of major consumers or consumer centres,  or be-
cause they are located close to the sea,  the Great Lakes or other waters, 
which offer them cheap and reasonably reliable supply lines to their mar-
kets. 
Consequently,  they can afford to,  and for the most part do,  abide 
by the anti-discrimination rules in force (admittedly in many respects 
differently formulated than those in the  E. C. S.C.  Treaty): this of course 
in effect restrains competition,  at any rate competition by price differen-
tiation. 
The fact that a  very marked trend towards concentration has de-
veloped in the United States too is another matter.  The growing degree 
of concentration is illustrated by the figures in Annex 1  and the correspond-
ing graph in Annex 2. 
The conclusion which here suggests itself for the Community is 
a  different one: the strong stimulus given to competition when it is both 
possible and necessary to operate price differentiation by aligning on 
extra-Community quotations induces as  a  natural reflex efforts to res-
trict competition,  though these are unlikely to be successful in a  slacken-
ing market. II 
CARTEL  POLICY 
6.  Having made these introductory points,  we can now go on to con-
sider more fully the High Authority's policy with regard to cartels,  i.e. 
agreements and arrangements serving to restrict competition. 
The first aspect which shoul<i be stressed (and is stressed in the 
Wagenfnhr Report) is the extremely sweeping nature of the actual prohi-
bition in Article 65, 1.  The provision that 
11all agreements among enter-
prises,  all decisions of associations of enterprises and all concerted 
practices tending to prevent,  restrict or distort the normal operation of 
competition'' are by the terms of Article 65,4 null and void, and "may 
not be invoked before any court in the member States, 
11  is drastic indeed. 
A  firmy-welded cartel able to withstand adverse circumstances needs 
disciplined internal cohesion and all necessary rights at law.  But if it 
lacks this strict internal organization and cannot coerce its members 
(more particularly by imposing penalties for non-compliance with its di-
rectives),  in consequence of the rule that cartels not approved by the 
High Authority have no means of legal redress,  then any illicit agreements 
of this kind prove extremely fragile and ineffective.  This applies in parti-
cular to such for the T reaty1 s  purposes thoroughly undesirable agreements 
as producers' price rings and tonnage pacts. 
That Article 65  does thus operate comprehetl.sively and directly 
has been borne out in practice.  Its operation is thus a  linchpin of 'th.e T .rea-
ty,  and more especially of the basic provision in Article Z that ''the mis-
sion of the European Coal and Steel Community is •••  progressively (to) 
establish conditions ·which will in themselves assure the m~st rational 
distribution of production at the highest possible level of productivity. 11 
7.  This is not,  of course,  to say that occasional efforts have not been 
detected to restrain competition by means of inter-enterprise agreements, 
•principally in connection with stiffening competition by price differPntia-
tion,  as described above.  In a  competitive stituation such as this,  Lhe 
High Authority,  as the executive responsible for compliance with the 
Treaty,  has to be continually on the alert for such attempts.  There is, 
however,  a  way in which it can keep a  general watch on restrictive prac-
tices,  namely by checking up all the time on the prices actually charged 
in practice. 
These indicate that,  for example during the recent notable wea-
. kening of the steel market, there can have been no undisclosed restricti-
ve practices on any scale to speak of: on the contrary,  price competition 
has be-come keener and keener. 16  Cartel Policy 
AGREEMENTS CONCERNING  NON-COMMUNITY MARKETS 
OR WITH NON-COMMUNITY ENTERPRISES 
Bo  Another question which has been posed in this connection is the 
attitude to be adopted to any restrictive agreements between Community 
and non-Community firm  so  Apart from Article 3,  f,  the Treaty's pricing 
rules do not apply to quotations to third countries.  The question original-
ly arose out of the Community steel industry's arrangement to hold regu-
lar meetings in Brussels with a  view to lining up enterprises'  sales ap-
proach in non-Community markets; here again this was economically dic-
tated by the fact that,  as we have seen,  oligopolistic markets offer oppor-
tunities for price differentiation,  notably by freight absorption. 
Accordingly - although commercial policy as such remains in the 
hands of the Governments  - the High Authority is keeping a  very careful 
eye on the general trend in non-Community markets,  more especially to 
see whether any concerted practices on the part of Community enterprises 
might be having repercussions contrary to the Treaty on competition with-
in the Communityo 
Up to now,  there has been nothing to suggest that this is the case. 
9.  Nor has there been any indication of restrictions on trade in T rea-
ty products with non-Community countries due to any causes other than 
official Government measures such as,  in particular,  that to limit im-
ports of non-Community coal. 
We have of course to remember the very considerable practical 
difficulties involved in concluding price or tonnage agreements also co-
vering non-Community markets - and that not merely by reason of the le-
gal obstacles presented by the GATT and,  indirectly,  the E. C. S. Co  T rea-
ty ruleso  Price and tonnage cartels,  to be really effective,  demand more 
thoroughgoing measures than just action on exportsa 
1 O.  Of even greater importance are the economic considerations pro-
per.  Any inter-enterprise agreement on prices and tonnages in non-Com-
munity markets is in itself highly vulnerablea  Since in present circum-
stances there can be no question of world cartels of all producers of any 
size in the markets concerned,  obviously only smaller-scale agreements 
are possible.  Now a  limited ring of producers adhering to price and ton-
nage agreements would simply be an incentive to other producers in the 
world to undercut them and offer larger tonnagesa Cartel Policy  17 
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Thus as things now stand,  really effective cartellization extending 
to non-Community markets is hardly practicable,  unless in respect of 
purely localized markets. 
Moreover,  the steady rise in the Community's imports of outside 
iron and steel products clearly demonstrates that there are no effective 
privately-agreed restrictions appreciably affecting trade in this sector 
at any rate between the Community and the rest of the world.  On the 
contrary,  the Community is faced  with real problems of commercial 
policy,  which have compelled the High Authority to take action. 
INTRA-COMMUNITY AGREEMENTS 
ll.  The implementation of Article 65  within the Community and the 
High Authority policy in this regard fall into two parts,  viz. 
(1) the prohibition of inadmissible restrictions of competition; 
(2) the authorization of restrictive arrangements under Article 65, 2. 
Prohibitions and refusals to authorize 
12.  For applications for authorization rejected under Article 65  the 
reader is referred to the list in the Twelfth General Report (No.  253), 
and to the High Authority's Decisions concerning certain concerted prac-
tices in the Common Market for  scrap and concerning the provision of 
information by the former regional bureaux of the Joint Office of Scrap 
Consumers (Journal Officiel des Communautes Europeennes of March 
12,  1960,  p.  551,  andMarch25,  1960,  p.  594). 
In a  nurnber of cases in which High Authority investigations are 
still in progress,  it is quite possible that authorization will be refused 
and/  or certain activities prohibited. 
13.  The problems involved may be divided under three heads,  which 
taken in combination provide a  reasonably accurate picture of the High 
Authority's past and present work: 
(a)  the joint coal-selling arrangements (partially complicated by a  number 
of Government measures adopted in the coal sector); 18  Cartel Policy 
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(b)  certain agreements concerning scrap; 
(c) attempts by some dealers to establish what would have amounted to 
a  sales cartel. 
Coal selling 
14.  The whole question of the joint coal-selling agencies has in recent 
years been largely bound up with the radical changes in the energy sector, 
which have in varying degrees involved the colliery companies in a  full-
scale structural crisis.  Very understandably,  efforts have been made to 
stem the shrinkage in sales outlets by cartellizing to the maximim,  and 
the Governments  of the countries affected have sought in various ways 
to alleviate if not to remedy the situation. 
15.  We are here concerned principally with the cartel aspect involved, 
which has,  incidentally,  been the subject for years of detailed discussion 
between the European Parliament and the High Authority. 
The development of the coal crisis has led in two concrete cases 
to serious difficulties under Article 65. 
(a)  The Ruhr mining companies submitted a  first application in De-
c ember 1959 for authorization to set up a  single agency to sell jointly on 
behalf of all the Ruhr collieries: this was withdrawn on February 29, 
1960,  and resubmitted with certain amendments,  and with reasons ap-
pended,  on May 2 0 following. 
The High Authority found itself unable to approve the application. 
The companies appealed against its refusal to the Court of Justice of the 
Communities:  the Court,  however,  in its judgment of March 18,  1962, 
dismissed the appeal and so upheld the High Authority1s  Decision No.l6/60 
of June 22,  1960 (cf.  Eleventh General Report,  Nos.  341  ££. ). 
(b)  Much the same trouble occurred over the Belgian coalmining in-
dustry1 s  efforts to establish a  single tightly-knit selling agency for all 
the country1  s  collieries while the Belgian coal market was temporarily 
sealed off under Article 3 7  of the Treaty.  Here again the High Authority 
could not see its way to endorsing such a  sweeping restriction of compe-
tition.  In the end,  the Belgian companies, after lengthy negotiations,  sub-
mitted a  fresh application for permission to institute much more loosely-
organized joint-selling arrangements,  with some companies left unaffi-
liated. Cartel Policy  19 
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In view of the  sizeable proportion of the industry's production re-
presented by the unaffiliated collieries,  and of the limited powers to be 
allowed the new agency Cobechar,  the High Authority on January 16,1963, 
gave its approval,  subject to eight specified conditions. 
In both cases, therefore,  the High Authority strictly observed the 
criteria for authorization set forth in Article 65. 
16.  The question remains,  however,  what changes,  if any,  need  be 
made to the Treaty,  and in particular to Article 65,  to enable mor• 
fective steps to be taken to cope with the structural crisis resulting from 
the developments in the energy market. 
As early as July l,  1960,  the European Parliament in plenary 
session carried a  Resolution (based on a  Report to it by M.  Poher} of 
which points 7  and 8  ran as follows: 
"(The European Parliament ••• } 
"is of the opinion that the provisions of the Treaty establishing the 
European Coal and Steel Community have proved in several res-
pects difficult to implement,  more especially with regard to pric-
ing,  cartels and concentrations; 
"requests the High Authority to examine as soon as possible how 
the Treaty could be amended to eliminate the difficulties in ques-
tion,  and thereupon to submit proposals on the subject,  taking due 
account of the aims and objects of the Treaty." 
A  joint Council of Ministers/High Authority Study Committee was 
then set up,  which drafted a  proposal (1)  .for the amendment of Article 65 
in accordance with the "minor revision" procedure provided for in Article 
95,  3-4, and submitted this to the Court of Justice for a  legal ruling (l)o 
The Court's judgment handed down on December 13,  1961,  stated that 
such drastic amendment of Article 65  was incompatible with Article 4  of 
the Treaty,  and hence could not be effected by "minor revision. 11 
17.  The High Authority also declined to approve under Article 65 cer-
tain proposed arrangements for the joint buying of scrap.  While the nega-
tive Decision in question are not among the most important of its Decis-
ions in connection with Article 65, they deserve mention an account of 
the principle involved,  which is likely to face the High Authority with 
(1)  For details see Tenth General Report,  No.  265. 20  Cartel Policy 
further problems in the future.  The principle is that of the competition 
to be postulated in weak and highly speculative markets of major import-
ance in keeping the Community steel industr_y properly supplied with one 
of its indispensable raw materials,  namely scrap. 
An account of the scrap market and the scrap supply problem 
will be found in Nos.  486-494 of the Wagenfllhr Reporto 
The problem has several aspects.  In the first place,  price move-
ments,  especially where influenced by speculation,  cannot be considered 
a  normal factor in restoring market equilibriumo  In the second place, 
the Common Market has not enough scrap of its own,  which makes the 
scrap market more unstable than ever: the permanent ''scrap gap
11  renders 
it particularly sensitive to Government intervention vis-a-vis the Commu-
nity's traditional outside scrap suppliers. 
Consequently,  quite apart from actual official bans on scrap ex-
ports, fresh problems are bound to be constantly cropping up,  of the type 
which an effort was made in the past to solve by setting up the compensa-
tion scheme for imported  scrap,  under Article 53  of the Treaty,  which 
was authorized on May 19,  1953,  and continued until December 1,  1958. 
Dealers 
18.  Cartel problems will also come more to the fore in the trade as 
competition becomes keener in this sector too.  The Treaty,  it should be 
noted,  totally forbids straight price cartels and agreements allocating 
sales areas or fixing sales quotas: for these there is no possibility of 
authorization. 
Consequently,  one group of steel dealers who had drawn up such 
agreements relating to a  spcified portion of the market abandoned the 
scheme after clarifying the practical and legal position with the High 
Authority (1).  This may be presumed to have been noted by other dealers 
in the Community as a  precedent. 
Another highly intricate case now before the High Authority con-
cerns efforts by a  number of coal-briquette producers, all of whom are 
at the  same time dealers,  to introduce certain arrangements for techni-
cal co-operation without involving restrictions counter to Article 65  on 
competition within the trade. 
(1) See Tenth General Report,  No.  275. Cartel Policy  21 
19.  Thus by its negative Decisions and preventive action on cartels 
alone the High Authority has shown itself to have a  clearly-defined policy, 
even though it is at the same time evident that this has by no means al-
ways produced a  satisfactory overall economic solution to the problems 
presented by the various situations concerned. 
Authorizations 
20.  On the other hand,  in the course of its activities the High Autho-
rity has also issued a  number of authorizing Decisions under Article 
65,2. 
As we are concerned to indicate the main lines of the High Autho-
rity's policy,  there is no object in enumerating the many minor authori-
zations granted (e. g.  of small selling agencies),  some of which have 
since ceased to be required (see list following No.  253  of  the Twelfth 
General Report).  It seems preferable to show,  referring where appro-
priate to some of the more important Decisions,  how the High Authority 
is trying to tackle certain problems of economic policy under Article 65. 
There are three categories of Decisions which merit special attention 
in this connection,  viz.  the authorization of joint coal-selling and coal-
buying agencies,  the authorization of specialization agreements and joint-
selling arrangements for certain iron and steel products,  and the autho-
rization of a  system for the coal trade closely approximating to speciali-
zation. 
Joint buying and selling of coal 
21.  Most of the main points have already been made regarding the 
basic problems involved in Decisions concerning joint coal-selling agen-
cies.  In addition,  the WageniUhr Report (No.  33 6}  specifies one particu-
lar difficulty presented not only by Article 65 but even,  on careful exa-
mination,  by Article 2.  The provision in the latter that 
"the Community must progressively establish conditions which 
will in themselves assure the most rational distribution of pro-
duction at the highest possible level of productivity,  while safe-
guarding the continuity of employment and avoiding the creation 
of fundamental and persistent disturbances in the economies of 
the member States" 
would suggest a  regulating mechanism based on the principles of liberal 
economics.  As has been pointed out on the subject of the range of action 
open to enterprises in an oligopolistic market,  however,  it is by no means 22  Cartel Policy 
possible to count on disturbances in the Community's economic affairs 
balancing up of the.mselves.  Consequently,  the High Authority has tire-
lessly urged the need for a  co-ordinated energy policy. 
It has done  so in particular in the interests of the coalmining in-
dustry,  since in this sector,  quite apart from the strategic pas sibilities 
for enterprises in an oligopolistic market,  the natural and unalterable 
production conditions,  and hence the differences in production costs, 
are more and more tending to rendre this basic provision of Article 2 
unworkable  - a  point also repeatedly emphasized by the European Par-
liament. 
22.  This is not the place to describe in detail the Community coal-
mining industry's present structural difficulties.  The High Authority is, 
as we know,  doing its utmost to bring the member States to formulate 
a  single common energy policy.  Unless and until they do  so,  the factors 
responsible for the structural crisis will continue to operate unchecked. 
The problem is that the coal crisis will not solve itself by the 
disappearance of uncompetitive collieries without this at once endanger-
ing other important Treaty objectives.  Consequently,  eventheCourt of 
Justice in its judgment upholding the High Authority• s  refusal to endorse 
the establisment of a  single R uhr coal-selling agency did not at all con-
clude that such extensive competition as this was necessary in the coal 
sector,  only that there must be a  certain minimum of competition among 
large units. 
23.  Ruhr coal-selling agencies.  -The High Authority has approved the 
institution of two separate agencies for marketing R uhr coal,  which it 
considers definitely do ensure that minium of competition the Court has 
construed the Treaty as demanding.  The Netherlands Government,  how-
ever,  has lodged an appeal against its authorizing Decision.  As the mat-
ter is at present sub judice,  the High Authority would confine itself to 
the following observations. 
24.  By the terms of the agreements submitted by the mining compa-
nies and the conditions on which the authorizations were issued,  the two 
agencies must be regarded as distinct and independent bodies.  Hence the 
great prerequisite for competition between them is present.  The prohi-
bition on interlocking directorates ensures that this precondition is ob-
served,  and will,  it is hoped,  make impossible any organizational tempta-
tion for the two to enter into illicit restrictive agreements.  Mere suspicion 
that the prohibition in Article 65, 1  was nevertheless being circumvented 
and a  single R uhr coal-selling agency being clandestinely reorganized 
would not have been sufficient grounds for an adverse Decision: the High 
Authority has guarded against such a  danger (which cannot of course be 
altogether ruled out in the case of the two agencies,  any more than with Carte1 Policy  23 
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any other independently-operating enterprises in any sector) by availing 
itself of the supervisory powers provided for in Article 47 of the Tr.eaty, 
which are set forth in detail in the conditions accompanying the Decisions. 
25.  As regards the respective size of the two agenci.es,  the High Autho-
rity had a  ready-made yardstick in the Court's findings as contained in 
Judgment No.  13/50.  The question the Court deemed itself required to 
answer was: 
"Beyond what point does the tonnage offered by or through a  cartel 
constitute such a  1 substantial part of the products in question with-
in the Common Market' as to interfere with competition in that Mar-
ket in a  manner incompatible with the aims and objects of the Trea-
ty? 11 
{Compendium of Community Case Law,  Vol.  VIII,  p.  231). 
The Court found that the proportions represented by the originally 
envisaged single agency - ranging from 26. l1o  to 43. 11o  of the total ton-
nages of hard coal,  hard-coal briquettes and hard-coal coke sold in the 
Common Market in 1959 -did,  even after any "necessary minor correc-
tions" to these figures,  constitute a"  substantial part" within the meaning 
of the question.  It further compared the respective size of the major sel-
ling agencies in the Common Market for the purposes of Article 66,2, 
which indicates "the importance attached by the Treaty to relative enter-
prise size with regard to the pattern of competition,'' and found as fol-
lows: 
"It is a  matter of public knowledge that the production of,  for ex-
ample,  hard coal of the enterprises affiliated  to the single selling 
agency is approximately four times as  great as that of any other 
coalfield in the Common Market,  and twice as great as the total 
prqdu.ction of the Charbonnages de France,  the only ether .o.rgaJ\i .. 
zation of comparable size"  · 
{Compendium,  Vol.  VIII,  p.  233). 
26.  In the light of this,  we need only recall the facts set forth in Deci-
sions Nos.  5  and 6/63. 
In tbe coal year 1961-62,  the shares of the m1n1ng companies affi-
liated to the two present agencie~ in the aggregate sales of the prooucts 
concerned in the Common Market ranged from 14.2 to 23. S1o  in the case 
of the Prasident Agency,  and from 11. 5  to 21. 01o  in the case of the Geit-
1ing Agency. 24  Cartel Policy 
A  comparison of the 1961-62 production of the companies affiliated 
to the two Ruhr agencies and of the Charbonnages de France works out as 
follows: 
Pd!sident  Agency  Geitling Agency  Charbonnage  s  de 
France 
•ooo  o/o  of  •ooo  o/o  of 
1000  o/o  of 
metric  Common  metric  Common  metric  Common 
tons  Market  tons  Market  tons  Market 
total  total  total 
Hard coal  57,890  25.3  54,933  24. 0  51' 854  22.6 
Hard-coal 
1 '989  14.2  1,675  12. 0  4, 980  35.6  briquettes 
Hard-coal coke  16,507  2 o.  6  14,729  18. 4  7,829  9.8 
Accordingly,  the Decision notes that: 
"there would be no notable disproportion in size between these 
two agencies.  On the contrary,  the Common Market would contain 
two new units similar,  even though not actually equal,  in size. 11 
2 7.  Oberrheinische Kohlenunion.  - A  number of competitive problems 
have also arisen with regard to joint buying of coal and joint processing 
of that coal into  briquettes and other valorized products.  As will be re-
called,  the High Authority's first important move in this connection was, 
in the course of negotiations concerning the remodelling of coal distri-
bution in South Germany,  to secure the separation of the distribution net-
work from the colliery companies,  by authorizing the Oberrheinische 
Kohlenunion as a  joint-buying association of South German coal dealers 
under Article 65,  with the proviso that the independent dealers,  i.e. 
those not affiliated to particular collieries,  must have a  majority of the 
votes. 
It can of course be objected that this arrangement offers no assu-
rance that it is not a  camouflaged continuation of the earlier system.  The 
High Authority,  constantly mindful of this danger,  kept any such possibi-
lity well within bounds by intensive check-ups: however,  it has found 
that the Oberrheinische Kohlenunion is in point of fact developing more 
and more into the body the authorizing Decision designed it to be  - an 
independent joint-buying association of South German coal dealers. Cartel Policy  25 
This outcome must be rated a  High Authority success in imple-
menting Article 65  of the Treaty,  in line with the latter's general aims 
and objects,  in such a  way as to remodel a  given state of affairs in accor-
dance with a  constructive market-pattern pohcy,  so that it tends of its 
own accord to conform with the system sought by the Treaty.  Instead of 
destroying an existing arrangement performing a  useful economic func-
tion,  the High Authority conducted lengthy discussions with the firms of 
dealers concerned,  and finally got it settled that they should take over 
the Oberrheinische Kohlenunion as an association specifically of dealers, 
protected against undue influence on the part of the producers,  and hence 
no longer serving to impair or distort competition among the collieries 
and their selling agencies in the producers' interests. 
Steel specialization agreements 
28.  The stiffening competition in the steel market has led,  as well as 
to a  trend towards increased concentration (see following Section),  to 
agreements designed to promote rationalization of steel production and 
distribution.  Thus the High Authority has approved two agreements bet-
ween the German steel firms Salzgitter AG.  and llseder Htitte concerning 
specialization in the production and joint selling of merchant bars and 
wire-rod (Decisions Nos.  5/61 and 7/61). 
29.  The further intensification of competition both inside and outside 
the Community suggests that more agreements of this kind are likely to 
be on the way.  Plans have come to the High Authority's knowledge for a 
specialization agreement which several major German steelmaking en-
terprises hope to conclude in respect of merchant bars and other steel 
shapeso  This would raise quite a  far-reaching  problem of economic po-
licy,  touching the interests of producers,  dealers and consumers alike. 
The producers in wishing to allocate rolling tonnages,  e. g.  for merchant 
bars,  among several plants in order to permit continuous rolling of the 
same dimensions  are very naturally concerned primarily to economize 
on costso  Savings on production costs,  however,  are in the dealers' and 
consumers  1  interests also,  particularly if the rationalization of production 
enables delivery dates to be shortened and hence the volumv  of dealers' 
stocks to be reduced.  It goes without saying that the agreements i1.  ---J.Ues-
tion must not be so wide in scope as to endanger the degree of competition 
prescribed by the Treaty.  Such competition is essential if the Communitys 
operational effiency are to be turned to the general account,  io  e.  shared 
with the consumer. 26  Cartel Policy 
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Coal trade 
3 0.  By its Decision approving an agreement for a  delimitation of func-
tions between the French coal wholesale and retail trades,  which it rules 
to be closely comparable with a  specialization agreement,  the High Autho-
rity has taken an extremely important step in a  major matter of principle. 
Constant efforts are being made to see that suppliers do not as a  general 
rule compete against their customers,  i.e.  that wholesalers do not at the 
same time operate as retailers. 
So long as this is left to the discretion of the individual firm, there 
is no problem from the point of view of the Treaty's provisions on com-
petition.  But it is a  different matter where agreements are contracted de-
limiting respective functionso  There are many such agreements in the 
Community,  and the High Authority found itself required to decide whether 
it should regard Article 65 as applying to these or noto 
It treated the French coal trade's division by agreement into a 
wholesale and a  retail block as a  test case enabling it to is sue a  ruling 
of far-reaching importance.  In this it laid down that such agreements, 
though quite customary,  did constitute restrictions of competition with-
in the meaning of Article  65, 1  of the Treaty,  and accordingly required 
authorization under Article 65, 2. 
It is in no way the High Authority's intention to put obstacles in 
the way of agreements or combinations to institute a  reasonnable alloca-
tion of functions.  By issuing this Decision,  however,  it has equipped 
itself to ensure that these are not more restrictive than is necessary for 
their purpose. III 
CONCENTRATION  POLICY 
31  Q  Concentrations are broadly speaking of two kinds, 
- horizontal concentrations,  between enterprises carrying on the same 
activity (one steel plant with another); 
- vertical concentrations,  between enterprises operating at successive 
stages of the economic chain (e. g.  a  steel plant with a  manufacturing 
firm,  a  colliery with a  firm of dealers). 
HORIZONTAL CONCENTRATIONS 
32.  As can be seen from the list in the Twelfth General Report 
(second table following No.  254),  a  number of sizeable horizontal con-
centrations have heen authorized,  particularly between steelmaking 
enterprises.  Some of them,  as is explained more fully in Nos.  3 54 ££. 
of the Wagenfuhr Report,  are properly speaking reconcentrations,  part 
of the reversal of the post-war decartellization of German steel firms. 
There have,  however,  also been large-scale concentrations elsewhere 
in the Community,  namely the Cockerill-Ougree merger in Belgium and 
the establishment of the Societe Mosellane de Siderurgie,  Parisg 
Horizontal concentrations of this kind have faced the High 
Authority with some difficult problems regarding the implementation of 
Article 66.  Since most of the enterprises concerned were already sub-
stantial producer units in their own right,  one question to be decided 
was at what point such a  concentration would infringe the requirements 
of Article 66  owing to the sheer weight of the intending participants. 
As  was noted in our introductory remarks,  this does not depend 
solely on their absolute size and importance as such,  but also on their 
relative importance vis-a-vis other enterprises,  i.e.  on the market 
pattern: this involves appraising the production programme. 
The problem is rendered peculiarly complicated by the fact that 
market and production conditions do not stand still,  but are developing 
all the time.  Community crude-steel production has risen from 28  Concentration policy 
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41,900,000 metric tons in 1952 to 72,700,000 in 1962: inevitable,  this 
has affected the market pattern.  Enterprises which before the war 
possessed as wide a  variety of plant and production lines as they needed 
have found themselves compelled by the new production and market condi-
tions not only to turn out larger tonnages,  but also to broaden their range 
of products.  This had given a  very considerable impetus to the forming 
of concentrations. 
Consequently,  the already oligopolistic market has become more 
closely-knit than ever.  This,  however,  by no means necessarily means 
a  lessening in competition: on the contrary,  a  smaller number of more 
powerful competitors can even result in its intensification. 
33.  The great question is at what point a  compact oligopoly consisting 
of a  limited number of large enterprises can be deemed to involve the 
danger of ossification in the competition required by Article 66, 2,  either 
because this handful of major operators prefer to consider one another's 
interests to such an extent that effective competition ceases,  or because 
the biggest combines of all become undisputed market leaders to be 
meekly imitated by the rest. 
In  dealing with this problem, there are no absolute rules to refer 
to,  and no past accumulations of experience to use in evaluating the 
situation with an eye to the future.  All the High Authority can do is assess, 
taking careful account of all the factors involved,  the changes likely to 
occur in the market pattern as  a  result of projected concentrations.  For 
this,  however,  it does have quite a  number of useful pointers permitting 
a  reasonably objective appraisal of the situation. 
34.  First, there is the trend in the enterprises' position in relation 
to one another.  The Wagenfuhr Report makes clear that despite the 
number of concentrations to date there is no reason for concern on this 
score: its graph on p.  57  shows the market pattern today to be consider-
ably more balanced than,  for instance,  before the war. 
35.  The same applies when we compare the degree of concentration 
for the Community steelmaking enterprises as a  whole with that in the 
other major producer areas,  the United States,  Britain and Japan. 
Annex 1 gives the respective production and capacity percentages. 
From these a  graph has been plotted (Annex 2),  using the device custom-
arily employed to show the degree of concentration in a  particular eco-
nomic sector,  the Lorenz curve: that is to say,  the more evenly product-
ion is spread over the individual enterprises in that sector,  the more 
evenly the curve rises,  until in the ideal case of absolutely equal  dis-
tribution it figures on the graph as a  diagonal.  Where on the other hand 
there are a  multitude of small firms and a  few very lage ones,  the curve Concentration policy 
(indicating cumulatively the production of the whole sector} is at first 
very shallow and towards the end rises steeply. 
This method,  then,  if we disregard the actual enterprise sizes 
concerned,  can well be used to show the degree of concentration in 
different countries.  Our graph indicates  (as do the conclusions of the 
Wagenfuhr Report) that in the Community iron and steel production is 
more evenly divided among the individual enterprises than it is in an 
other three areas. 
36.  This is one valuable pointer suggesting that the trend towards 
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concentration in the Community steel sector is in accordance with the 
requirements of Article 66.  The fact that the actual size of the Com-
munity enterprises is very often greater than that of their opposite 
numbers in Britain,  and usually much smaller than that of the corres-
ponding American corporations,  is  a  comparatively minor consideration 
-- especially if it is borne in mind that the British industry has its Iron 
and Steel Board to co-ordinate and,  so far as may be,  specialize its 
production,  so that concentrations for this purpose are in many cases 
unnecessary. 
The relevant market 
37.  In weighing up projected concentrations the High Authority has 
not,  however,  simply gone by the weight of the enterprises in the 
Community overall.  It has examined the sales situation for the enter-
prises from the geographical angle,  and determined for each case the 
"relevant market",  as in American anti-trust practice. 
This means that the market influence of a  given enterprise is 
calculated assuming that the resulting restriction of competition will 
affect a  smaller area in relation to the Common Market as  a  whole,  and 
will hence be less advantageous to the enterprises concerned. 
38.  The relevant market for the purpose of assessing a  restriction 
of competition is the market in which the enterprises operate and carry 
on or are exposed to effective or potential competition.  This market 
has to be determined with respect both to the particular products and to 
geographical extent. 
39.  As  regards products,  the principle is that the relevant market 
covers products which the consumer can use interchangeably for the 
same purpose.  Thus for instance in the case of the Societe Mosellane 
de Siderurgie (Somosid) it was found that broad-flanged beams were 3 0  Concentration policy 
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more and more competing with,  and even supplanting,  the other types 
of beam: hence it is possible to define a  single relevant market for both 
categories. 
40.  Geographically,  the relevant market is usually the area in which 
the enterprise in practice sells most of its production.  In this 1narket it 
is a  seller,  in competition with the other sellers there,  and it frames 
its sales policy in accordance with the conditions there prevailing. 
However,  the market so defined proves too constricted when the 
enterprise in working out its sales policy has also to take account of the 
potential emergence of further competitors.  This is very much the case 
where,  in view of the existence of large-scale,  up-to-date production 
capacities,  of the type and cheapness of the products,  and of consider-
ations of price in relation to transport costs,  this potential additional 
competition is liable to materialize at any time.  When this is so,  the 
boundaries of the relevant market have to be drawn as far beyond the 
enterprise's main selling area proper as may be indicated by the 
conditions of the potential competition in question. 
Consequently,  it is not possible to define the relevant market 
geographically with complete accuracy,  only to establish its apporximate 
boundaries,  which the High Authority has to do on the basis of its know-
ledge of each particular case. 
41.  The relevant markets determined according to these criteria need 
not,  of course,  remain the same indefinitely and in all eventualities: 
they may well have to be extended,  if only owing to increased market 
interpenetration,  as well as to radical changes in production methods, 
and hence in production costs. 
With the progressive consolidation of the Common Market,  the 
relevant markets for steel at any rate may be expected to widen steadily, 
until they become increasingly co-extensive with the Common Market 
itself.  This of course means a  greater number of competitors,  and 
greater actual and potential competition. 
42.  In addition,  it should be noted that when the relevant market in 
question has been determined considerable difficulty is often experienced 
in determining the respective shares of the market.  Frequently an 
accurate geographical breakdown of delivery statistics is not available 
for all the parties concerned.  Even in considering potential competitors, 
or in connection with projected new joint ventures,  it is necessary to 
refer to the production figures. Concentration policy 
43.  In the High Authority's early days the concept of the relevant 
market did not arise.  In deciding whether proposed restrictions of 
competition were permissible,  the High Authority did in each case take 
into consideration the position in respect of the national as well as of 
31 
the Common Market,  though without specifically stating the reasons for 
the distinction.  The shares of the enterprises concerned in both markets 
were calculated,  and the conclusion reached that these did not offer such 
scope as to be inadmissible under Article 66, 2.  That is to say,  the High 
Authority made no attempt to examine and determine which market was 
the really relevant one: it merely indicated the maximurn (Common 
Market) and the minimum (national market).  It was only able to do this 
because all the applications quite obviously fulfilled the conditions for 
authorization. 
In  the Sidmar case,  however,  this procedure was not practicable. 
For one thing,  as Sidmar was a  new enterprise to be launched jointly by 
a  consortium of existing firms,  there were no previous delivery connect-
ions to go by; for another,  the Belgian market could clearly not  be treated 
as the relevant market since,  other considerations apart,  the new enter-
prise's comparatively high-grade flat products were manifestly intended 
to be sold well beyond Belgium's frontiers.  The conditions for the pro-
duction and sale of these of themselves create a  very sizeable market, 
in which each producer is most vitally concerned by the potential com-
petition of the rest: each is compelled in making policy decisions to take 
into account what the others might do,  even if they have not,  or have 
only occasionally,  competed with him closer home.  Accordingly,  the 
relevant market defined in this case was the whole northern industrial 
triangle. 
In the case of the concentration August Thyssen-Hi.itte/Phoenix-
Rheinrohr,  a  distinction had to be made between flat products on the 
one hand and finished rolled products other than flats on the other.  In 
consideration of the sales conditions,  the Federal Republic of Germany 
was decided to be the relevant market for the latter,  and a  larger area 
(on the same grounds as those applying in the case of Sidmar) for the 
former: purely for the sake of statistical simplicity,  this larger area 
was  not the northern industrial triangle,  but the whole Common Market 
less Italy. 
In the case of Somosid the question was to determine the relevant 
market for beams,  wire-rod and merchant bars.  With regard to these 
products,  it was found that the enterprises to be concentrated were in 
competition with all Community enterprises selling to France,  Belgium, 
Luxembourg,  the Saar en south-west and south Germany.  These areas 
were accordingly taken as the relevant market. 32  Concentration policy 
Market influence of the major enterprises 
44.  This problem always arises when one out of a  fair number of 
competing firms occupies a  specially strong position in all or certain 
of the markets concerned.  Article 66 unequivocally insists that any 
application by such a  firm for authorization to concentrate with another 
cannot be  considered H the position in question is a  "dominant" one. 
The question remains,  however -- and the Wagenfuhr Report 
restated it (in No.  362) with reference to the August Thyssen-Hutte/ 
Phoenix-Rheinrohr case, then still pending -- precisely where the line 
is to be drawn between permissible and  impermissible market influence, 
i.e.  up to what point authorization can be granted,  or,  as the Report 
puts it,  "whether a  concentration representing some 20 1o  of German 
crude-steel production still qualifies for authorization (due account of 
course being taken of all other facts,  and in particular of the enter-
prise structure).  11 
45.  The point is not,  as the High Authority has emphasized in a 
memorandum to the Internal Market Committee,  to draw a  hard-and-fast 
line.  This would not indeed be possible: there are far too many factors 
to be considered,  varying in incidence from case to case,  and often 
needing to be rapidly reassessed in the light of changes in production 
techniques and market patterns.  This is true of any share in the market 
of any product: it is especially true in the case concerned,  inasmuch 
as crude-steel has properly speaking no "market",  but is merely the 
criterion for the general importance of a  steelmaking enterprise and 
its rolling potential.  The market shares of finished rolled products have 
to be determined case by case,  taking into account all the circumstances 
specifically involved. 
Consequently,  it is not even possible to indicate a  size that could 
be cited as a  valid criterion in all cases and for all products. 
It may be added that the reason  why the figures for enterprises' 
crude-steel capacity or production are constantly recurring in country-
by-country comparisons is -- aside from their guidance value -- that 
crude-steel is a  genuinely comparable indicator. 
46.  With regard to the "size" of the Thys sen-Phoenix concentration, 
the first point to be noted is that the crude-steel indicator,  to have any 
significance at all,  must be related not to German but to Community 
crude-steel production overall.  The proportion then works out not at 
20 1o  but at barely 10 1o.  In considering the products to be affected by the 
Decision,  the High Authority came to the conclusion that the market 
share resulting from the concentration could not possibly,  in all the Concentration policy 
circumstances,  constitute a  threat to competition,  since there would 
continue to be a  sufficient number of competitors whose shares would 
afford an adequate counterpoise to maintain it. 
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In addition,  the High Authority bore well in mind that even a 
concentration whose share in each of the individual product markets is 
not unduly large can nevertheless endanger the maintenance of that 
minimum of competition which the Treaty insists and the Court confir ..  s 
to be necessary,  if it does not fulfil the general prerequisites for com-
petition in an oligopolistic market.  From this point of view the Higr 
Authority regarded as the three prime essentials: 
- that the individual market operators should be independent of one 
another; 
- that the incentive to independent action should not be destroyed by their 
having advance knowledge of one another's reactions,  since only un-
certainty as to their competitors' future behaviour,  and hence uncer-
tainty as to the effects of any given step in their own market policy, 
can prevent ossification (i.e.  in this type of market restriction) of 
competition; 
- that individual enterprises or associations of enterprises should not 
be  able to evade the rules of competition in force under the Treaty. 
In these respects also the High Authority concluded that it could, 
in virtue of the general discretion allowed it by the Treaty,  approve the 
concentration,  subject to various conditions,  which are set forth in 
detail in the Twelfth General Report (No.  240). 
Its finding was therefore that the concentration in question did 
not overstep the bounds laid down by the Treaty with respect to the 
establishment of unduly powerful positions in the market. 
Joint ventures and group effects 
4 7.  The increasing emphasis on the installation of capital-intensive, 
continuously-operating steelworks and rolling-mills has led to various 
projects for doing this as a  joint arrangement between two or more 
existing steel companies. 
One well-known instance is the establishment by several French 
steel enterprises, before the Treaty came into force,  of the big ~lat­
products company Sollac.  Another important case of this kind,  also 
concerning joint production of flats,  was the establishment of Sidmar 
by a  group of Belgian,  Luxembourg and French firms,  on which the High 
Authority is  sued a  major Decision of principle. 34  Concentration policy 
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48.  The Sidmar case was the first to demonstrate that the restrictions 
of competition likely to result,  through direct and indirect concentrations, 
from such joint ventures must be considered as a  group effect,  so that 
the shares of the market and/  or shares of production concerned had to 
be taken into account in assessing the overall restriction involved (cf. 
Eleventh General Report,  No.  349, and Wagenfuhr Report,  No.  369 ). 
The High Authority in this particular instance,  however,  concluded that 
in all the circumstances the conditions for authorization were fulfilled, 
notwithstanding the group effect. 
49.  In the case of Somosid,  on the other hand,  granted the existence 
of a  group effect competition would have been restricted in respect of 
such very large shares of production that the project could hardly have 
been authorized.  Accordingly,  a  number of steelmaking firms with 
financial interests in the holding companies controlling the joint enter-
prise were debarred,  by a  condition attached to the authorization,  from 
representation on the Board and administration of the latter.  In this way 
they were prevented from participating with inside knowledge of Somosid' s 
current business affairs in discussions and decisions concerning invest-
ment,  production and marketing policy.  The restrictive effects of this 
co-operative arrangement were thus brought within authorizable limits 
(cf.  Twelfth General Report,  No.  242). 
The Somosid case clearly illustrates what a  helpful instrument 
the power to attach such conditions is for the High Authority to approve 
concentrations which are desired by the enterprises and in line with the 
aims and objects of the Treaty. 
50.  The restriction of competition liable to result from groupings of 
this kind is of course not immediately comparable with complete sup-
pression of competition such as would follow,  say,  a  merger.  All the 
same,  it is not impossible that a  group of enterprises launching a  joint 
venture will in certain fields not only not compete with the new company 
but  also discontinue or limit their competition with one another.  This 
depends largely on the relation between the new enterprises's and the 
founder enterprises  1  production programmes. 
If all the enterprises concerned make the same or interchange-
able products and sell them in the same relevant market,  competition 
among them in respect of these products is admittedly not bound,  but 
very likely indeed,  to be restricted. Concentration policy  35 
Other groupings 
51.  The question of group formation and group concentration is thus 
very far from being solved.  With the march of technical progress the 
High Authority will certainly be confronted by fresh problems,  particular-
ly in those parts of the Common Market,  such as France and Belgium, 
where groupings by means of interlocking participations between producer 
enterprises have been a  favourite device for concentration. 
In other countries -- especially Germany,  where the trend towards 
concentration has up to now taken more the form of monolithic combines --
this problem is accompanied by another (due to the same technical reasons), 
namely the probability of an extension of the system of long-term contracts 
for the supply of semis,  for such purposes as ensuring better utilization 
of hot wide-strip capacity.  This problem,  which cannot be gone into here, 
may in some circumstances also have to be considered with reference to 
Article 65. 
In both cases,  care will have to be taken,  by close examination 
as to eligibility for authorization and by making any necessary stipula-
tions in such authorizations as are granted,  to ensure that the technical 
improvements attainable through group action or through long-term sup-
ply contracts are in fact as far as possible attained,  without involving the 
establishment of such close interconnections among the major groups as 
to make continued effective competition among them impossible. 
52.  Lastly,  there is one further possible new development to which 
the High Authority is devoting particular attention -- the acquisition of 
holdings in Community enterprises by firms in third countries,  and more 
especially in the United States. 
One main aim here must be to see that this does not lead to in-
direct intra-Community concentrations on a  scale incompatible with 
Article 66.  It is not intended to imply that the presence of third-country 
enterprises within the Common Market will ne_cessarily result in  res-
trictions of competition: on the contrary,  the higher degree of product 
specialization frequently associated with these enterprises may well give 
rise to an intensified substitution race.  Moreover,  the effect may even 
be -- take for instance the recent announcement that a  new enterprise 
is to be started in Belgium by two American steel firms -- to increase 
the number of competitors,  which would also serve rather to heighten 
than to lessen competition.  · 36  Cone entration policy 
VERTICAL CONCENTRATIONS 
53.  Finally,  as can be seen from the second table following No.  254 
of the Twelfth General Report,  the High Authority has also approved a 
considerable number of vertical concentrations.  Most of these have so 
far been of very limited economic importance: only a  handful of con-
centrations between enterprises in the coal and steel sectors and manu-
facturing or trading firms have been on any scale to speak of. 
54.  Link-ups between steelmaking and manufacturing enterprises 
have for the most part amounted to nothing more ambitious than,  for 
example,  the acquisition of a  controlling interest in a  shipyard. 
In quite a  number of cases steel firms have taken over small 
manufacturing businesses: the concentrations were often almost inci-
dental,  the manufacturers having been previously the steelmakers' 
customers and now surrendering control to them,  frequently for such 
reasons as that owing to family or other circumstances they were either 
unwilling or unable to continue operating independently. 
Taken all in all,  these concentrations have so far been of minor 
importance for the purposes of Article 66.  In particular, there has 
never been any serious question of "establishing an artificially-privileged 
position" within the meaning of Article 66, 2. 
55.  However,  there do exist in the Community a  few vertical con-
centrations in which the manufacturing side is as large or larger than 
its E. C. S.C.  counterpart.  Practically all of these. were established 
before the Treaty came into force  ..  The Wagenfuhr Report {No.  46) puts 
their number at seven and their aggregate crude-steel production at 29o/o 
of the Community total. 
56.  Vertical concentrations between producer enterprises and raw-
materials suppliers have also been inconsiderable in scale,  nor,  in view 
of the general trend in the Community coalmining and iron-ore industries 
in particular,  does there seem at present any likelihood of larger ones 
being planned. 
57.  In order that the High Authority shall not be burdened so much in 
future with the examination of small and unimportant concentrations,  its 
Cartels and. Concentrations Department is now studying whether the 
dividing-line below which minor concentrations {especially veTtical ones) 
do not require prior authorization has not been fixed too low.  After all, 
what· matters for the purposes of Article 66 is -not that every little Concentration policy  3 7 
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vertical concentration should be checked beforehand,  but that prior 
authorization should be applied for where Community enterprises in 
considerable numbers are making a  regular policy of linking up  with 
smaller firms ahead or  astern of them in the production chain. 
The point is not to insist on prior authorization of the odd case 
of this kind,  but to keep a  check on the cumulative effects of whole series 
of such concentrations,  as for instance where mining companies or big 
coal wholesalers acquire control of large numbers of medium-rank whole-
sale firms or of retail businesses. 
It will admittedly be no easy matter to work out formulas cover-
ing and defining the cumulative effect of vertical concentrations in the 
many fields in which these can be effected.  Nevertheless it is absolutely 
essential to the legal security of the enterprises concerned that this 
should be done. 
The High Authority will report to the European Parliament in 
due course on the progress achieved in this regard. ANNEXES 40 
Comparative 
Distribution of Steel Production among 
the 20  Largest Enterprises of the Community, 
Japan,  Britain and the United States, 
1960-62 
Order of enterprises or  E ..  C. S.C.  Japan  U.K. 
groups of enterprises  o/o  (1)  1o  (2) 
1960-61  1961-62 
1o  o/o 
1  7. 9  9. 7  24.7  12.-
2  7.2  7.9  17.2  11. 6 
3  6.7  7. 2  10.4  10. 1 
Top  3  21.8  24.8  52.3  33.7 
4  5. 8  6. 7  6.9  10. 1 
5  5.4  s. 8  4.5  8.6 
6  5. 1  5. 1  4. 3  6.6 
7  5.- 5.- 3. 8  6.6 
8  4.7  4.7  3.6  6.3 
9  4.3  3.9  2.8  6. 1 
10  3.9  3A4  1.6  4. 1 
Top  10  56.- 59.4  79.8  82. 1 
11  3.4  3.2  1.4  2.5 
12  3.2  3,- 1.4  2.2 
13  3. - 2.9  1. 2  1.5 
14  2.9  2.9  1.2  1. 4 
15  2.9  2. 3  0.9  1. 1 
16  2. 3  2,2  0.8  1.-
17  2. 2  1.8  0.8  1.-
18  1. 8  I.  8  0.7  1.-
19  1. 8  1.7  0.7  0.8 
20  1. 7  1.6  o. 6  ... 
Top  20  81. 2  82.8  89.5  94.6  ( U. K.  top 19) 
All 'other enterprises  18.8  17.2  10. 5  5.4 
100  o/o  100  '1o  100  1o  100  % 
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Note:  The E. C. S.C.  figures  show the distribution (l) before and (2) after 
the August Thys sen-Hutte/Phoenix-Rheinrohr concentration.  Although 
this was finally authorized.only in 1963,  for the sake of comparability 
1961  has been used as the reference year for both columns. 
The E. C. S.C.  Lorenz curve in the accornpanying graph has been plotted 
from the figures in the first column. ----------------------------------------------------------------
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In  the theoretical case of completely'  equal distribution of production throughout a sector, the curve would 
appear on  the graph  as a diagonol ( ste s»bsection 35 of text, and explanatory note lollowing). 
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Explanation of Graph ?howing Comparative 
Degrees of Concentration in the E. C. S.C., 
Japanese,  British and American Steel 
Industries {Annex 2) 
The steel firms concerned appear on the abscissa. 
Annex 3 
x  may be any figure from 1 to n,  n  being the number of enter-
prises and concentrations of enterprises in the Community,  Japan, 
Britain and the United States respectively. 
As the very small enterprises are commonly too specialized to 
be relevant for purposes of comparison {e. g.  producing only or prin-
cipally special steels),  the accompanying graph relates only to the 
20 largest enterprises in each area.  These are given on the abscissa 
from left to right in ascending order of magnitude. 
The ordinate,  read against the curves,  indicates in each case 
the cumulative production of the enterprises,  by the formula n-{x-1). 
Thus for example if x=l,  i.e.  if all the enterprises are taken 
together (n-(x-l)=n),  this brings us out at the end of the curve,  !OOo/o  of 
production. 
If x=2,  we come to the point on the curve concerned which shows 
the cumulative production of all the enterprises in question except the 
largest one of all; if x=5,  that of all except the four largest,  and so on. 